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Abstract
After a general analysis of the impact 
of Thailand’s economic integration within 
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations), this paper will look at the 
evolution of regional integration 
mouvance in South East Asia, the issues 
concerning convergence and divergence 
of the member states, and the 
perspectives  for  2010  At  the  same 
time it will attempt to answer the 
following  questions:  what  would  be 
the  most  effective trade integration, 
the best regional investment, and the 
best areas for monetary, financial, poli-
tical, institutional and social regional 
co-operation  agreements, and how
interesting, at the end of the day, is 
ASEAN integration for Thailand?
1. THE THAI ECONOMY AND
REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Understanding how the post-financial
crisis was managed helps us to appreciate
the internal capacity for adjusting to change
(monetary stabilization, lowering of interest
rates, control of inflation, macro-economic
equilibrium), in view of the structural reforms
(environmental equilibrium, education,
commercial law, restructuring of the banking
and finance systems, new laws on foreign
investment) and the constraints of global and
regional integration (interdependence, need
for outside capital, global market laws). The
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main issue is the capacity of the industrial
and financial sector to relaunch growth in
the context of industrial over-production and
the need for technological investment within
the framework of a regional integration
process, limited for the moment to 10
countries, mainly within the AFTA (Asian
Free Trade Association) free-trade zone. The
impact of regional integration on the principal
sectors of the Thai economy can be
illustrated through the macro-economic
factors.
1. The macro-economic indicators
2001-2002(1)
The economic situation shows heavy
external dependence despite effective
control of the macro-economic equilibrium.
The year 2001, greatly affected by the
external economic climate (Japan, USA,
Europe), was marked by a fall in exports
(6.4%) but the balance of trade remained
sound because of lower imports and an
increase in income from tourism. Growth in
gross domestic product (GNP) was only
1.8% because of sluggish private
consumption (3.2%) and private investment
(0.8%). Public expenditure increased by
6%, with public debt at almost 60% of GNP,
and control of inflation remained effective.
Direct foreign investment was again on the
rise (from 115,3 to 166,9 billion bahts), and
there was a remarkable effort to curb the
trend towards an increase in debt, which
affected the balance of capital, last reserves
have increased(2)(3).
In terms of the private sector at the end
of 2001(4), the traditional industries found
themselves in a difficult situation with, for
example, the stagnation of the textile sector
in the face of strong regional competition.
Substantial growth in turnover together with
stagnant EBITDA meant that companies had
difficulty controlling their running costs, not
because of cost drift but rather because of
increased international activity which
hampered price controls. Furthermore,
fluctuations in profit ratio on turnover meant
that financial expenses from prior debts were
paid in foreign currencies. With production
capacity at 60%, high debt, difficulty to
obtain credit, and the restraints inherent in
being quoted on the stock exchange,
investment recovery was seriously hampered,
although this was compensated by an upturn
in private consumption. The move from
gearing ratio to capital cover confirmed the
upturn in the financial situation due to greater
stock market activity, the conversion of
current liabilities to long term liabilities, and
external debt reduction.
In 2002(5), the objective was to reduce
expenses and the public deficit to 3% of
GNP, but the poor economic climate and
the deferral of a VAT increase to 10% so as
1 Table showing internal and external indicators (Annex 1)
2 Notes of French Economic Office (PEE) Bangkok, Situation conomique de la Thaland(2002)
3 Year End 2002 Economic Review, Bangkok Post
4 Notes of French Economic Office (PEE) Bangkok, Etat du secteur priv thalandais in 2001
5 Notes of French Economic Office (PEE) Bangkok, Situation conomique et financire de la Thalande
au premier semestre 2002  (November 2002)
61
Economic Perspectives of Thailand’s Regional Integration for 2010
ABAC Journal Vol. 24. No. 3 (September-December, 2004, pp. 60-86)
not to hold back domestic consumption, led
to fiscal reflation, with a new objective of a
3.6% deficit, based largely on a boost in tax
revenue, in particular from the automobile,
telecommunications, electronics and service
sectors. The shortfall was financed by bond
issues and a tough monetary policy to bring
inflation down to under 1%. The government
signed agreements for automatic swaps with
Japan, Korea, and China and backed the
project for an Asian bond market. To meet
the cost of long term debt, 5% growth will
be necessary over the next few years.
The first half of 2002 confirmed the
upturn in private consumption (3.6%
increase), growth in private investment
especially in construction, an increase in the
use of production capacity to over 60%, a
recovery in export volume, and a 54%
increase in the balance of trade thanks to a
drop in imports and in spite of the slow down
in dollar exports. But Thailand is slow to take
transitional measures to increase its
production range.
2. Foreign investment and balance of
payments
In 2001, the substantial increase in
direct foreign investment, particularly in the
sectors of electrical and electronics
products, metal, petrochemicals, textiles and
trade, came largely from Japanese firms
which represent around 50% of all foreign
investment. These firms were looking to
relocate their production (Hitachi planned a
research and development unit and
production facilities for electrical products
to counter Korean competition)(6).
Singapore accounts for virtually all the
ASEAN investment flow towards Thailand.
The global flow of direct foreign investment
in 2002 totalled 46% for the Far East and
South Asia, with 50% for China, 9% for
Singapore, 4% for Thailand and 3% for
Korea.
In 2002, there was a downturn during
the first 9 months with disinvestment during
the third quarter (6) due to the attractiveness
of China and ambiguous reports concerning
foreign firms (priority given to local suppliers
in order to develop added value etc.).
Positive measures were introduced by the
Board of Investment of Thailand, however,
with fiscal advantages for the installation of
head offices. At the same time, portfolio
investments increased, a clear sign of a
buoyant Thai and regional market. The need
for direct foreign investment was substantial
given the level of debt and the difficulty to
increase export values. The recovery of the
stock market in Bangkok demonstrated
renewed interest from foreign investors while
intra-ASEAN investments benefited from
national advantages.
The net flows of non-banking capital
between 1996 and 2000, shown in annex 2,
demonstrate the low level of direct
investment from ASEAN countries, apart
from  Singapore, and the existence of a
regional investment space if we take the
ASEAN+3 zone (Japan, China, Korea)
(56.7% of investment flow in 2000).
6 Notes of French economic Office (PEE) Bangkok, Investments (December 2002)
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Portfolio investments, apart from the erratic
flow from Korea and Hong Kong, mostly
come from Singapore. Lastly, with regard
to Thai investment in foreign equity capital,
only the ASEAN countries (especially
Singapore) and China benefited, and it
remained marginal compared to the incoming
flow from other foreign capital.
3. Exports and imports
The table in annex 3, illustrating the
geographical distribution of imports and
exports from Thailand, shows that the
amount of trade with ASEAN changed very
little if we compare 1996 and 2001 (21.7%
in 1996 and 22% in 2001 for exports, and
13.5% in 1996 and 16.2% in 2001 for
imports), with a period of regression due to
the 97-98 financial crisis. On the other hand,
if we look at ASEAN+3, where we find
Japan as the main trading partner with China
rising steadily in second place, the
percentage of exports to imports ranges from
45 to 55%, demonstrating a real regional
integration of trade in an era of globalization.
According to the Bangkok Post, the
geographic distribution of exports in value
from January to September 2002 was the
following: USA-Canada (21%, down),
Europe (15,5%, down), Japan, Korea,
Taiwan (somewhat less than 20%, well up
for Korea and down for Japan), China, Hong
Kong (10%, well up), ASEAN (a little over
20%, up by 6%), in other words around
55% for the Far East, and other countries
(around 12%). China, with whom trade has
increased four-fold in 7 years, has become
Thailand’s third supplier and fifth largest
client, third with Hong Kong(7). The rise in
exports and the stagnation of imports with
ASEAN enabled Thailand to chalk up a 75%
surplus in 2001, so that ASEAN became
the main trading partner, before Japan and
the USA, for the first time during the first
half of 2002. Most Thai tariffs will be phased
out by 2010 including those on sensitive
products such as coffee, flowers, onions,
tapioca, rice, tobacco and petrochemicals.
Average tariffs in Thailand on ASEAN
products fell from 9.8% to 7.3%
between1999 and 2001, dropping yet
further to 4.6% in 2003, the aim being to
decrease tariffs to less than 5% (7).
The table in annex 4 shows the extent
of ASEAN and ASEAN+3 trading with
regard to the main product lines, based on
the ASEAN database. With a 22% average
in 2001, ASEAN export figures have seen
little change since 1996. The most integrated
product lines are mineral products (55.7%),
chemicals (46.9%), machinery and electrical
appliances (26.9%), followed by vegetable
products, oils and fats, plastic products, base
metal and metal articles (around 25%).
Compared to an average of 16.2% in 2001,
ASEAN imports are slightly up since 1996,
the most integrated product lines being wood,
wood articles and paper (33.8%), mineral
products (24.3%), machinery and electrical
appliances (18.9%), chemicals (16.5%), live
animals (16.5%), and plastics (16.3%),
which indicates rather insignificant and highly
variable regional integration, depending on
the sectors. Furthermore, the table in annex
7 Notes of French Economic Office (PEE) Bangkok, Commerce extrieur de la Thalande (March and
November 2002)
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5 shows that the cover ratio of imports by
exports for intra-ASEAN trade has been
largely superior to 1 since 1998, which has
also resulted in a trade surplus (see previous
paragraph).
The ASEAN+3 table in annex 4 shows
that exports on many product lines in 2001
were over 40% intra-ASEAN (43.6% on
average): mineral products (75.8%),
chemicals (68.2%), plastics (52.2%), live
animals (50.3%), machinery and electrical
appliances (49.2%), stones, cement and
ceramics (47.6%), base metal and metal
articles (47.1%), wood, wood articles and
paper (44,3%), prepared foodstuffs
(42.6%), and oil, vegetable and fat products
(42,4%). In 2001, intra-ASEAN imports
were also over 40% (averaging 48%) on
many product lines: stones, cement and
ceramics (70.4%), footwear (64.4%),
plastics (62.2%), machinery and electrical
appliances (57%), base metal and metal
articles (51.8%), optical, precision and
musical instruments (50.9%), wood, wood
articles, and paper (49.6%), chemicals
(44.9%), and vehicles (41.3%). These
figures highlight its increasing positioning as
a regionally integrated trading area, with the
most integrated import-export markets in
mineral products, chemicals, plastics, base
metal and metal products, machinery and
electrical appliances, wood, wood articles
and paper, and stones, cement and ceramics.
Nevertheless, inter-regional trade remains
linked to American activities and to
reorganisation of the production chain in Asia
in view of the growing competition from
China. In terms of exports, Thailand has
difficulty upgrading its product range apart
from vehicles and electronics, but there is
no integrated channel, while for imports,
machine-tools and electronics are re-
exported. In the long term, AFTA+3
perspectives could reduce dependence on
the USA.
The conflict between Cambodia and
Thailand has led Thailand to suppress all
bilateral programmes, as well as provoking
a delay in the implementation of the great
Mkong project. Today, however, we are
seeing a recovery in trade and investment
(7). Exports to Cambodia are mainly in
prepared foodstuffs, petrol, two-wheel
vehicles and iron, leather and wood imports.
Thai investments (fifth place) are in key
sectors such as tourism, telephone,
telecommunications, agriculture, transport,
and basic industries.
2. THE REGIONAL INTEGRA-
TIONIST MOUVANCE AND ITS
PROSPECTS
According to Tertrais(8), in order to form
a regional economic integration zone, a
certain amount of economic, political, and
cultural solidarity is necessary to give
members the sense of belonging to a same
body with international visibility.
1. Environmental factors in regional
economic integration
Divergent structural factors
Divergences arise, on the one hand from
the heterogeous nature of the civilisations and
8 TERTRAIS H., Asie du Sud-est: enjeu rgional ou enjeu mondial?, Ed Folio Actuel, 2002,  278p
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cultures, which range from Indian, Chinese,
and peninsular and insular cultures, the latter
including the Buddhist and Malaysian worlds,
with Indian and Muslim influences as well as
Chinese and western influences, and on the
other hand differences in geographical size,
population size, wealth and growth, religion
(Buddhism, Islam, Christianity), political
systems (monarchies, authoritarian and more
or less liberal republics), economic systems
(liberal with more or less government control
or communism). Furthermore, the ASEAN
zone has been the contemporary field of
conflicts with Europe, Japan, the communist
block countries, and China (Vietnam). On
the other hand, convergences arise from the
fact that it has historically been a trading area
for many centuries, it is globally poor with
more or less minor players (GNP lower than
in France), and it is a real economic maritime
centre (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand).
Restrictive political and institutional
factors
Founded by authoritarian states,
ASEAN’s logic is more national than
ideological, which means that, given their
economic implication, the authorities are
accused of being responsible for the crisis
through nepotism or excess of
authoritarianism. The crisis led to certain
practices being dropped as well as an
awareness that national logic is sometimes
limited (deforestation). The rise in the middle
classes and the new means of communication
fostered the emergence of a more influential
civil society in the decision-making process.
ASEAN found it impossible to deal with the
crisis for operational reasons, having no
power to impose a solution; it simply became
a forum for negotiation, putting forward
suggestions in order to unblock certain
situations. The decision-making process by
consensus, for cultural reasons (unanimous
decisions where nobody loses face) and
nationalist reasons (ASEAN is inter-
governmental and non supranational), allows
agreements to be reached with no objections
but there is incompatibility when urgent
decisions need to be made (lower rubber
prices, forest fires, occupation of the
Spratleys Islands) or when somewhat
unorthodox compromises are made (too
rapid integration and ignorance of money
laundering in Burma). These decisions and
compromises have reinforced the status quo,
blocked negotiations with external partners
and caused ASEAN to lose its diplomatic
credibility. Understanding and confidence
between the leaders are no longer sufficient
to deal with serious national or regional
problems. ASEAN will have to introduce
institutional reforms for it has neither the
means (means of intervention, permanent
structure etc.), nor the political will to make
its voice heard on the international stage.
Social factors
The rise in the middle classes,
communication and urbanisation, has tended
to homogenize societies and their problems
to some extent, making them more open to
outside influences, increasing schooling and
eradicating illiteracy, and leading to a
decrease in the number of families with more
than 2 children. Nevertheless, rural
populations remain high (around 50% in
Thailand) and western modernisation is not
always a positive factor for the local societies
(Thailand). Modernisation has destroyed
certain cultural values, and led to changes in
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eating habits in urban areas as well as a rise
in individualisation, despite the fact that Thai
society is historically very close-knit, even
in its vertical relations. There is still little
mechanization in farming, while textile,
automobile, and electronics industrialisation
and a growing service sector have led an
increase in salaried work. New
differentiations and social inequalities have
appeared as well as an exploited female
work force and a black market sector in the
towns. During the crisis, the countries had
to take emergency measures, leading to
higher social spending. Thailand spent 2.3
billion dollars(9) on job creation programmes,
social infrastructure projects, increases in
redundancy packages and greater social
protection.
With globalization, population
movements such as the migrant flow from
Burma and Cambodia to Thailand, and from
Thailand to Malaysia and Singapore, led to
a certain melting-pot of migrant workers, but
with the depression, unemployment put a
stop to immigration (migrants sent back from
Malaysia and Thailand and borders closed),
and national preference took the place of
regional co-operation. There was no regional
control of these population movements
which obviously could not continue in times
of crisis. Furthermore, with the intensification
of urbanisation and an ageing population, the
problem of a qualified workforce will
become more acute for all ASEAN countries
apart from Singapore. Korea, Thailand and
China will have to face this problem before
the end of the decade.
The security factor
Faced with new risks of conflict
between the different states(10) and the return
of the Americans to the region, there is a
question of security in the region given the
arms race taking place at national level.
Nevertheless, ASEAN has chosen to adopt
a double strategy, on the one hand creating
a regional Asian forum, which brings together
the ASEAN+3 countries, the USA, Russia,
and the South Pacific, where strategic
discussions can take place to construct the
mechanisms necessary to prevent conflict,
while, on the other hand, delegating initiative
and means to allied countries, and fostering
peace-keeping initiatives. In terms of internal
conflict (piracy, drugs, financial and fiscal
crime), regional co-operation is ensured by
specialised ASEAN organisations which
deal with periodic problems, but concerted
action is limited by the absence of any real
policy over and above national interests,
issues of sovereignty and the legal differences
of the partner countries.
The scarcity of resources
The destruction of the environment will
not only have an economic cost but will also
increase dependence on the outside. Given
the rapid urbanisation, unplanned
industrialisation, and massive agricultural
irrigation, water shortages are highly likely
due to insufficient resources and poorly
developed infrastructures (Korea, China,
Thailand, Singapore). Cutting down forests
will lead to flooding and loss of production
(Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma). In
terms of air pollution, while the major Chinese
9 TERTRAIS H., Asie du Sud Est: enjeu rgional ou enjeu mondial?; Ed Folio Actuel, 2002, 278p
10 Korea, Taiwan, Paracels, Spratleys, ..
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cities are among the most highly polluted in
the world, the problem of pollution in large
Asian cities is not irreversible. In Tokyo, for
example, the use of catalytic converters and
filters on factory chimneys has led to a
substantial decrease in pollution, at the same
time reducing costs both in terms of health
and the economy. With regard to food levels,
cereal reserves are below the ONU minimum
(18%) and ASEAN has become a net
importer, as have China and Japan, while
demand has increased because of changes
in eating habits. Lastly, with regard to energy,
petrol will remain the dominant form of
energy in Asia (apart from China which uses
coal) until cheaper forms of energy are found
as a replacement, and this will increase
external dependence in the next five years.
An economic and geopolitical area with
no centre of gravity
The financial, economic and social
crisis, which has destabilised the global
integration movement, has affected the
intermediary countries the most, in other
words Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea. The
solidarity which arose to deal with the crisis
did not result in effective regionalisation. It
provided no concrete answers either to the
extent of the problem or the return of capital,
as the different economies are too
heterogeneous. On the contrary, national
reactions dominated, with an increase in
temporary exemption procedures to defer
the new AFTA legislation. Regional
contagion of the depression demonstrated
that there has been an increase in intra-
regional trade, and that the end of the crisis
in the medium term necessitates greater
regional integration, as national solutions can
no longer be found in globalisation. Regional
measures must be accompanied by
monitoring mechanisms, prevention, control,
and adjustment.
For some members (Philippines,
Thailand), the financial crisis presented an
opportunity for change, with a few regional
solutions being put forward. At the same
time, it brought into question the principle of
non interference for certain problems (fire
etc.), which has affected the evolution of
several countries. Other members preferred
to keep the status quo, preferring to
reactivate ASEAN in a better economic
climate. ASEAN, which manages the
tensions between regional and national
interests, has become a forum where an East-
Asian identity may be forged by those
wishing to ‘Asianize’ western cultural and
scientific values. Today, its success may be
measured by its capacity to conciliate the
struggle between the autocratic powers and
fundamentalists and the principles of a
market economy. ASEAN clearly wants to
become a geopolitical power through
economic measures (creation of a free trade
zone), political measures (extending to
Indochina and Burma), and strategic
measures (regional security forum), as well
as through specific agreements with Japan,
China et Korea. The regional integration
process is highly complex, for, on the one
hand, ASEAN is finding it difficult to
transform its political ambitions into an
economic project and, on the other hand, it
tends to identify to some extent with the axis
ASEAN+3. However, it cannot continue to
stay on the sidelines if it is to ensure regional
stability and foster a climate of confidence,
covering political, security, environmental,
social, and diplomatic issues.
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2. The AFTA free trade zone and its
potential for the future
A slowdown in intra-ASEAN trade
The tables in annexes 7 and 8, show
that the increase in value of intra-ASEAN
trade for the strong growth period, 1993
to1997, (95.4% for exports and 66.7% for
imports) was not sufficient to noticeably
increase the relative percentage of intra-
ASEAN trade to external trade outside the
ASEAN zone, particularly in imports
(24.9% instead of 21.1% for exports and
18.2% instead of 17.4% for imports), given
the global integration movement which led
to a more or less parallel trade increase with
East Asian countries and the USA. Despite
the downturn in trade due to the depression
at the end of 1997-1998, intra-ASEAN
trade in value was higher in 2000 than
the1997 level (+11.6% for exports and
+13.9% for imports), resulting in a rise in
the percentage of regional imports (21.3%
instead of 18.2%). On the other hand,
regional exports fell slightly (23.2% instead
of 24.9%). 2001 saw a regional trade
recession due to the sluggish economy of the
main international players, and also to
stagnation in regional trade (22.8% for
exports and 21,3 % for imports). This
slowdown in intra-regional trade, which
stabilised around 21-25% in spite of the
highly jittery economic climate, was mainly
due to two factors; on the one hand, a lack
of complementarity in the economies which
developed in parallel with the global
integration movement, and on the other hand,
the fact each country was more interested in
its own growth, with the result that regional
industrial projects were never finalised due
to national ambitions (vehicles). Co-
operation is effective mainly as a means of
negotiating access to overseas markets.
Measures needed to reinforce AFTA
A first step will be to extend the AFTA
list of 15000 products identified which no
longer correspond to the real needs of the
member states and which represent a
relatively small percentage of commercial
transactions. These products slow down the
integration of sectors such as electronics and
vehicles as they need additional negotiations
in terms of product definition, application
deadlines, and national standards.
Harmonisation of norms will allow
economies of scale to be made, particularly
in the context of global integration. A second
measure would be to speed up the
application of new policies and extend them
to services. A further measure would be to
progressively harmonise the VAT rate and
to do away with the different duties on the
principal market products.
Co-operation over legislation on
competition will help regulate agreements
and prevent abuse from more dominant
members, thereby ensuring fair trade
between the member states, as powerful
monopolies often result in higher prices and
lower standards. Furthermore, public
subsidies must remain coherent with the
principles of a market economy and not
interfere with competition, although some
dispensation should be given to help develop
regions in difficulty or to restructure vital
product sectors. With regard to privatisation,
deregulation of public service monopolies
will result in a service with a higher quality/
price ratio and a separation of the
infrastructures, which can still be managed
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by the public monopolies. The services
should be managed on the basis of
competition, although a minimum level of
social cohesion should be maintained at the
same time. This would necessitate state
regulation as well as the application of a
national tariff in order to avoid the risk of an
interruption of activities in certain regions.
Harmonisation of national legislation is also
necessary in the health, security and
environmental sectors in order to deal with
external or natural crises.
As agriculture is a key sector in most
ASEAN countries, there needs to be greater
liberalisation and more pertinent co-operation
over agricultural policies, particularly as it is
a trading sector which represents a major
integration factor (rice, rubber etc). Since
the slump in rubber prices, the leading
producer countries (Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia) have applied an export reduction
plan of 4% a year over five years, which is a
‘first’(11). The objectives are to obtain a rise
in productivity, an improvement in the
standard of living for farmers with more
stable markets and prices, guaranteed
supplies, and stability in consumer prices.
Conditions must include the free circulation
of farm products, a preference for domestic
products, agreements on prices and
quantities, limiting price guarantees to certain
production volumes in order to avoid
speculation, and aid linked to the
environment and desertification. These
measures will mean a partial customs union
can be established for the farming sector,
leading to additional trade flow between the
member states. In this way, national
suppliers of every member country where
costs are the lowest can develop their
exports within the area, phasing out less
efficient producers, or even giving preference
to less efficient suppliers within the area
rather than to external suppliers. The net
result of this creation of traffic will be even
more marked once the measures mentioned
earlier are taken with regard to reinforcing
AFTA (norms, VAT, competition etc.), given
that the initial domestic customs protection
is already strong and foreign imports are
relatively few, the technological level is
similar, the regional market is vast, and the
economies are complementary. Difficulties
may arise, however, from the fact that
production units within the region are too
localised, which could benefit firms from
other countries operating in the area, and
also disadvantage companies from member
countries with production units outside the
area who wish to export to the region. On
the other hand, a partial customs union would
also benefit the automobile and electronics
sectors.
The reinforcement of the flow of trade
within AFTA will lead, firstly, to making the
area even more attractive to foreign and
regional investors confronted with a vast
domestic market with high development
potential, and secondly, to economies of
scale, such as cost reductions and more
competitive prices, thus stimulating demand
and company profits, making them more
competitive with more specific prices and
ranges.
11 TERTRAIS H., Asie du Sud-est: enjeu rgional ou enjeu mondial, Ed Folio Actuel, 2002, 278p
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Extending AFTA to an ASEAN+3zone
ASEAN+3 trade (China, Korea,
Japan) represents around 50% of exports
and imports in the region. The relative
percentage of this trade has grown since the
end of the high growth period, in spite of a
certain global stagnation. The export rate
was 41.3% in 1993 and 48.3% in 2001,
while the import rate was 47.5% in 1993
and 49.5% in 2001, with a high of 52.5% in
2000. Growth in trade resulted more from
trade with China and Japan than an intra-
ASEAN flow. It led to the Singapore-Japan
free trade agreement and the China-ASEAN
agreement in 2001, which provides for free
trade in 2010. The ASEAN+3 structure
corresponds better to economic realities, and
the free trade zone will therefore be extended
to China, Korea, and Japan, where the
advantages strongly outweigh the
drawbacks. Chinese competition will oblige
some countries, including Thailand, having
to become more specialised and produce
better quality products, but it also provides
a major zone for imports. In reality, trade
between ASEAN countries and China is
increasing more rapidly than intra-ASEAN
trade or trade with Japan, and a more
pragmatic approach will progressively
contribute to the development of the
AFTA+3 zone by 2010.
3. What co-operation in terms of
development and investment?
A substantial flow of direct foreign
investment and a non existent intra-
ASEAN flow
The downturn in direct foreign
investment weakens all the interlocking
relocation strategies in the Asia Pacific region
(electronic components). Redistribution of
capital has therefore been introduced, partly
as a result of the production capacity being
transferred to international investors together
with a wave of relocation in a mixed
globalisation/regionalisation process. This
was because the need for capital, following
the economic crisis, meant that most
restrictions to the opening of capital were
lifted. Singapore lifted restrictions on foreign
controlling interests in banks, Malaysia no
longer imposes a threshold, and the same
goes for Korea and Japan. Thailand favours
deals with Japan, its main regional ally and
principal economic partner, to avoid falling
into western hands. Hence, Japanese capital
is invested in Thai banks, and Mitsubishi has
taken 96% control of the second distributor
of Thai vehicles. On the other hand, 2001
saw a revival in direct investment in some of
the region’s countries, as in Thailand, for
ASEAN remains an attractive market with
a 0.5 billion consumer potential and the
possibility for substantial economies of scale
(cf. previous paragraph on the effects of
AFTA). With regard to intra-Asean flow of
capital, Singapore has reinforced its influence
by taking control of the banks in Thailand,
the Philippines and Indonesia, and also by
receiving substantial investment from Japan
and the USA. Intra-Asean investment is
generally quite haphazard, however, and,
apart from Singapore, remains marginal.
What investment strategy is needed?
The Singapore development model was
based on planned industrialisation for export,
in line with the market evolution, at the same
time ensuring employment, income, and a
high standard of living. It was based on
industrialisation in three stages; firstly, an
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industry based on a substantial labour force,
secondly, on high value added industries
(petrochemicals, semi-conductors), and
lastly on a highly technological industry
(telecommunications). This was combined
with a deliberate policy to foster training,
local employment and skilled foreign labour.
The other ASEAN countries were not ready
to accept the constraints involved, which led
to an influx of short-term capital in non
productive spheres or to industries requiring
high manpower, little knowledge transfer and
massive loans.
Some countries are beginning to base
their economy on a more up-market
production strategy in certain sectors, such
as Thailand with synthetic fibres and plastic
products, based on a national industry and
internal market. Globally, however, the
strategy remains the same, in other words,
promoting exports through the comparative
cost advantages of work/exchange rate,
based on assembly work and a bottom of
the range industry, with a focus on Pacific
Asia and the USA. Japan transfers its least
profitable production to the area, notably
Canon in Malaysia, and then reimports to
its own market in order to remain
competitive. However, the ASEAN
countries should be cautious of staying too
dependent on exports, as this can result in
strong sector-based and geographical
polarisation. Moving to more upmarket
production would seem a key move for
certain member states, particularly Thailand
and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia, given their
level of development, (although this is not
the case for Singapore) because the centre
of gravity is moving towards China which,
in 2001, chalked up twice as much direct
foreign investment as ASEAN.
The move will entail adopting new
technologies and products with higher value
added, as well as a more varied export
range.
The future of the zone would appear to
depend on information technologies, together
with Japan’s new relocation strategy.
Numerical development could help develop
the domestic markets, but the production of
goods requiring average technology remains
high in imports and does not always lead to
better technological power, as, if we look at
the example of Thailand and Malaysia,
electronic export products are mainly
produced by subsidiaries of multinational
firms unconnected with the local fabric.
Japan remains a leading investment and
trading partner, as no ASEAN country is
strong or credible enough to invest in setting
up technology industries, even though they
are necessary for sustainable development
within the region. A regional investment area
needs to be constructed with incentives, joint
fiscal laws, a joint open policy to foreign
investment, and priority zones and sectors,
accompanied by security and adjustment
measures. Furthermore, Chinese
involvement in this regional investment area
is also desirable to make the whole area an
even more attractive investment prospect,
particularly as China is soon to join AFTA.
Company restructuring is a priority
The Japanese development model and
its Asian emulation, with a central role for
the state and neo-corporatism, was brought
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into question during the economic crisis. And
the concept of  the state developer in
Singapore, associating public and private
capital was misappropriated as state
nepotism and  patronization, which eventually
led to the destruction of natural resources.
Restructuring of the key industries implies
redefining the role of the State, especially in
Indonesia, Vietnam, Korea, and China, and
the development of privatisation in certain
domains. This requires a reassessment of
business/political relations, greater
transparency and putting accounts back on
an even keel, but in the end these economies
offer great advantages including high savings
capacity and a high production capacity.
Economic and social co-operation for
depressed areas
To speed up the convergence of
countries or regions which have fallen behind
(employment, revenue, infrastructure,
qualifications of the workforce, geographical
distance), the first priority should be the
infrastructure, including transport,
telecommunications, energy, environment, to
avoid divergent effects. This is because
global integration tends to promote the
development of centres of activity, resulting
in economies of scale in production and
distribution, lower trading costs, a research-
development activity, and the development
of horizontal networks between the main
cities, thereby weakening the network of
proximity to the countryside, and threatening
the socio-economic equilibrium (China). A
well-balanced growth policy is required for
ASEAN, which means the decentralisation
of human resources, and financial resources
and infrastructures in favour of  rural areas,
as development aid cannot replace political
commitment.
4. Prospects for financial and monetary
co-operation
The absence of co-operation and the
weakness of the banking systems
The crisis arose from poor management
in the private sector (financing investments
in sectors of over-production or in non
productive spheres through short-term loans
in foreign currency without risk coverage),
the complicity of the authorities (absence of
prudential legislation, anchoring the currency
to the dollar, and the illusion of a
neutralisation of currency risk, public
guarantees which encouraged risky
behaviour linked to political relations), the
complacency of foreign lenders given the
facility of capital movement (desire to make
short-term profit), and the deficiencies of the
banking systems. Six aspects need
highlighting concerning the weaknesses of
ASEAN banking systems, apart from those
of Singapore. The first concerns the absence,
or the small number of bonds on the financial
market, the second the absence of evaluation
of loan risks attached to real estate
operations or to ambitious national projects
dependent on political pressures, the third
the inexistence of regulating bodies and
controls, the fourth the revaluation of banking
assets as capital gains were released on the
stock and real estate markets followed by
increases in capital, the fifth the absence of
allowance for bad debts, and the sixth the
effect of contagion given the many cross-
holdings of the banks.
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Financial co-operation remains limited,
despite some support for the baht in May
1997. Intra ASEAN capital flow (direct or
portfolio investment, loans) remains very
limited. Most foreign capital remains fairly
volatile in spite of a recovery in direct foreign
investment, particularly portfolio investments.
There is still a lack of transparency in the
financial systems although there has been
some progress (insufficient prudential
legislation and lack of structure in banking
controls). Japan, which has considerable
holdings and foreign exchange reserves,
suggested the creation of an Asian fund of
100 billion dollars, but this was abandoned
in the face of American pressure. Japan’s
inability to withstand this pressure means it
lost the opportunity to reinforce regional
integration, but the economic and financial
domination of Japan nevertheless remains
intact, as it is still the leading financial supplier
(recently joined by Europe), even if it is
currently restructuring its financial system.
There are too many differences to
envisage the possibility of a convergence
resulting in an Asian euro, particularly as this
would lead to a loss of monetary and financial
sovereignty. With regard to the currencies
used as payment for international trading with
Thailand (table in annex 9), for exports as
for imports, the euro and the yen are in
second position, as most trade remains within
the American NAFTA zone, but even with
ASEAN, Japan and the EU trade, the dollar
is used as the main currency, which means
there is no monetary centre of gravity in the
Far East.
The ideal regional monetary and
financial zone
The idea of a regional monetary zone,
based on a currency basket with a regulating
mechanism similar to the European currency
snake in order to stabilise exchange rates,
appears more realistic, but this will require
the co-operation of national monetary and
fiscal policies, although without creating a
supranational power. To be truly effective,
however, this must be backed up by financial
co-operation. The stability of the banking
and financial systems of most ASEAN
countries, apart from Singapore, requires
continued restructuring of the banking sector
in order to avoid a chain reaction of failures,
while enabling internal and external debts to
be controlled. The fundamental measures
ASEAN central banks will need to take to
set up a policy of stability include monitoring
of prudential ratios, selection and anticipation
of risks, preventative measures against
exchange risks, the definition of standards
for the financial and stock markets, securing
assets so as to mobilise capital, building up
provisions, and setting up audits and criteria
grids for company loan selection in order to
avoid non performing loans, thereby
forcing companies to adopt international
standards of financial management. As the
recovery of the financial markets is vital for
the restructuration of companies, two
aspects need to be developed; firstly, the
expansion of the bond market to mobilise
more capital, which seems to be the method
chosen by the Thaksin government in
Bangkok, and secondly, securing banking
liquidity by rediscounting the central banks
at regional level, using futures contracts.
Furthermore, monetary dematerialisation,
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and disintermediation will promote the stock
market.
Several limiting factors, due to the very
different social, economic, legal and political
environments, may prejudice consolidation
of a regional financial market. These include
the diversity of legislation and lack of legal
weapons in financial matters, the support for
sovereignty for cultural and political reasons,
but also the economic pressure groups, the
very different levels of development, the lack
of convergence of economic interests due
to poor complementarity, and lastly the
acceleration of global integration which runs
counter to the installation of a regional zone.
Expected effects on companies and the
banking sector of a regional integration
area
For companies, a regional monetary and
financial area will help promote transactions
and thus regional integration, encouraging
regional and foreign ventures, competition,
and mergers and acquisitions, and will weed
out non competitive actors. At banking level,
the expected effects will be added to those
of globalisation, promoting transparency and
the elimination of bad debts, as well as
competition and confidence in the banking
institutions, privatisation, a switch from trade
accounts to private liabilities, banking
concentration, the flow of incoming foreign
and regional capital, and a drop in interest
rate differentials. Lastly, it will promote and
increase the flow of stocks on the stock
markets with a corresponding increase in the
number of investors.
Banking supervision must be global:
one regional body of central banks
Banking crises were preceded by rough
and badly managed financial liberalisation
policies, characterised by exchange rate and
balance of payment problems, a rapid
increase in bank loans leading to inflation and
speculation bubbles, a surevaluation of
currencies resulting in a slowdown in exports,
a stagnation followed by a loss of
confidence. Added to the crises were the
risks of contagion by chain reaction, the risk
of illiquidity, and the risk of international
proportions in the face of dereglementation
and the global capital market. At international
level, regulations are imposed by market
discipline with fixed prudential regulations.
The organisation of banking controls at
regional level must reconcile several
objectives: it must harmonise legislation,
respect the diversity and autonomy of
national systems and ensure coordination
between national authorities. Harmonisation
of legislation concerns the free flow of
capital, the freedom to set up a business,
freedom to offer services, and monitoring by
the national authorities who are responsible
for economic controls. Supervision of
microeconomic prudence, such as the
monitoring of business establishments, is
decentralised locally. The regional board
of central banks will, however, intervene if
supporting an establishment endangers
banking liquidity or risks impacting on
interest rates. With regard to monitoring
macroeconomic prudence, when the
governance and stability of the banking
system presents a risk, co-operation
between national authorities is necessary to
ensure prudential measures are taken.
74
Michel PICAVET
Increasingly, financial companies have to
operate on the global market, resulting in the
development of transnational financial
conglomerates which can easily get around
regulations by transferring their activities to
less highly-regulated regions. Consequently,
monitoring needs to be global.
Looking forward to 2010
China, the key partner with Japan, has
the means to control the flow of capital, with
a fixed exchange rate and considerable
reserves, a savings rate of around 35%, a
very positive balance of trade, and less
export vulnerability than the ASEAN
countries, with exports averaging around 5%
of GNP compared with around 37% for
Thailand, according to Richer(12).
Furthermore, given the weaknesses of
ASEAN, Korea and also Japan, China was
asked not to devalue the yuan in order to
avoid competitive devaluations, highlighting
its global significance. China also has the
possibility to delocalise its production inland
to lower its costs, it defended the Hong
Kong dollar against speculation, managed
to maintain parity with the dollar, and joined
the WTO, thus strengthening its global and
regional integration positioning. In 2020,
economic power will be shared between
China and Japan. Japan will remain a key
trading and financial partner, relocating its
production and concentrating on its services.
China will become the main exporter of
manufactured products which is why
commercial, monetary, financial and
investment cohabitation will become a
necessity.
Two possible situations may be
envisaged for the future of ASEAN by 2010.
The first is that it will lose its powers to
coordinate and intervene as ASEAN will be
diluted in the global integration process,
provisional and partial protectionism
measures and exchange rate controls will be
introduced to benefit as much as possible
from globalisation, but it will find itself
incapable of reacting when confronted with
regional problems(13). The second possibility
is that ASEAN resolves its difficulties and
revitalises the regional co-operation zone on
three levels, enabling it firstly, to take on a
political, diplomatic and monitoring role,
while managing its natural resources,
secondly, enabling it to manage a regional
monetary, financial and investment zone, in
collaboration with the three associated
members (China, Japan, and Korea), and
thirdly, to develop a free-trade zone which
will include China, Japan, and Korea.
ASEAN’s future will be linked to the
evolution of the environmental factors
mentioned above and to the development of
more complementarity in the economies of
the member states, as well as to the political
motivation to confront globalisation issues
in a co-ordinated way. It remains strongly
advisable that ASEAN plays out its role fully
on a number of levels in order to preserve a
certain level of independence for its
members.
12 RICHER P., Crises en Asie du Sud Est, Paris, Presses de SciencesPo, 1999, 307p
13 DE SACY A., L’Asie du Sud Est, Paris, Vuibert, 1999, 263p
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